Why Ought I Be Rational? more

Why Ought I Be Rational? Joey Miller Second Year Master’s Student Virginia Tech Philosophy 5344: Kant’s Ethical Thought Professor Lydia Patton December 7, 2011 Joey Miller I. Introduction 2 In this paper I will argue that any attempt to ground ethical concepts in pure rationality (thereby necessarily excluding appeals to empirical facts)1 is inevitably inadequate because it cannot provide an appropriate answer to the “why be moral” question. While the ethical rationalists seem to have a simple and straightforward answer to this question, difficulties arise in any attempt to provide an answer while continuing to adhere to the rationalist approach. Essentially, for the rationalist, the question “why be moral?” reduces to the question “why be rational?”, and the rationalist has two ways of addressing this question. First, they can claim that the question is ridiculous and requires no explanation, or, secondly, they can see it as a legitimate question and attempt to provide an answer. I will argue that both attempts fail for the rationalist, and any attempt to answer the “why be moral” question cannot be done within a rationalist framework. In section II I provide a brief explanation of the rationalist approach, using Immanuel Kant’s framework as the primary example, followed, in section III, by an explanation of the rationalist’s answer to the question “why be moral?”. Section IV will draw out some of the difficulties in this seemingly straightforward answer by explaining the two approaches the rationalist can take and how both approaches are inadequate. Finally, in section V, I will explain the significance of this conclusion as it suggests that any attempt to 1 I will refer to those who attempt to ground ethical concepts in rationality as “ethical rationalists” throughout the paper. Joey Miller 3 build an ethical theory is going to seem to require a grounding of ethical concepts in empirical facts. II. The Rationalist Approach Since we are concerned with the foundation of ethical concepts, particularly whether they can be grounded in rationality, we need a reason why they should be grounded in rationality and how such an approach would work. Kant provides us with such reasons in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals2. First off, very briefly, if morality is to exist at all, then the concepts it employs (ethical concepts) need to be necessitating; and, in order for them to be necessitating, they need to apply universally. The first task is then going to be to explain why the ethical concepts must apply universally (and in virtue of what, must they apply), and rationality appears to be a good candidate, primarily because it is the only way to get necessitation3. Thus, as Kant emphasizes, the moral law (being an ethical concept) needs to apply to all rational beings in virtue of their rationality. Throughout the Groundwork Kant offers briefs explanations regarding why the foundation of morality (i.e., 2 Since Kant’s Groundwork seems like the easiest means (relative to Kant’s other works) of referencing or understanding this kind of structure, this will be my primary reference (Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Trans. & Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 37-108.). 3 “For, the pure thought of duty and in general of the moral law, mixed with no foreign addition of empirical inducements, has by way of reason alone (which with this first becomes aware that it can of itself also be practical) an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives, which may be summoned from the empirical field, that reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, despises the latter and can gradually become their master; on the other hand a mixed doctrine of morals, put together from incentives of feeling and inclination and also of rational concepts, must make the mind waver between motives that cannot be brought under any principle, that can lead only contingently to what is good and can very often also lead to what is evil.” (4:410-411). Joey Miller 4 the moral law), thereby ethical concepts, needs to apply to all rational beings4. For example: “…unless we want to deny to the concept of morality any truth and any relation to some possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is so extensive in its import that it must hold not only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions but with absolute necessity, then it is clear that no experience could give occasion to infer even the possibility of such apodictic laws.”5 This being the case, we cannot take reasoning based on experiences into account (when making moral decisions) because we would be unable to infer from this any kind of universal moral law6. Thus, we would be unable to infer any kind of foundation for our ethical concepts. In other words, if we take contingent conditions into account, then we will not find anything that is universal, thus, absolutely necessary. After the paragraph previously mentioned, Kant expands on this by asking what seem to be two rhetorical questions7. The first question suggests that if we were to allow empirical reasons into moral considerations, then we would not be able to apply the moral law universally, thereby making it difficult to find unlimited respect for the moral law. For example, if we were to attempt to find the moral law (i.e., a foundation for ethical concepts) by making empirical appeals to, say, something unique to humans, then we lose 4 5 See, e.g., 4:389, 4:412-4:413, 4:425 4:408 6 This is because reason based on experience can only apply to beings with similar experiences, and it is at least possible that not all rational beings have experiences similar to ours. Therefore, if the moral law takes reason based on experience into account, then the moral law cannot be applied universally. 7 “For, by what right could we bring into unlimited respect, as a universal precept for every rational nature, what is perhaps valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity? And how should laws of the determination of our will be taken as laws of the determination of the will of rational beings as such, and for ours only as rational beings, if they were merely empirical and did not have their origin completely a priori in pure but practical reason?” (4:408) Joey Miller 5 the requirement of universal application. As the suggestion follows, what is valid for humans, given the nature of being human (i.e., humanity), may not be valid for other rational beings; thus, not applying universally. The second question suggests, in a similar manner, that it would be difficult to make laws that apply only to humans (given the nature of being human) also apply to other rational beings. These suggestions raise issue with looking for the foundation of ethical concepts (i.e., the moral law) in empirical appeals because if we are looking for the foundation we are looking for something that applies universally, and if it only applies to a certain kind of thing in virtue of something unique to that kind of thing, then it fails to apply universally. Kant, earlier in the Groundwork, states that: “For, that there must be such a philosophy [“a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical” (4:389)] is clear of itself from the common idea of duty and of moral laws. Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity”8. This absolute necessity is only found when the law is applicable universally. Again, even though humans are a subset of the set of rational beings, Kant’s emphasis here is on the need for the moral law to be universally binding on all rational beings; not just binding upon humans or some other empirical matter. This need, according to Kant, is clear given the ethical concepts of duty and of moral laws. Duty, as Kant explains in 4:439, is the “objective necessity of an action from obligation”. If we understand the ethical concept of obligation as being grounded in a law, then we will 8 4:389 Joey Miller 6 understand that it is absolutely necessary. So, we need to find the moral law in pure practical reason if we are to ground our conception of obligation, and if we find it in pure practical reason, then it must apply to all beings that are rational; thus, the law is universal, and thereby necessary. To further this point, Kant explains: “any other precept, which is based on principles of mere experience – even if it is universal in a certain respect – insofar as it rests in the least part on empirical grounds, perhaps only in terms of a motive, can indeed be called a practical rule but never a moral law.”9 From this structure we can see that the grounding of ethical concepts in rationality takes place within a certain framework (i.e., they are operating on a certain set of presuppositions and attempting to answer certain questions). We can get a glimpse of this framework given that Kant’s argument is structured around “the moral law”; thus, it is structured around universality and necessitation. The rationalist theory that Kant is arguing for is structured around telling us that morality requires absolute necessitation (thereby, universal application), and “good” or “morally correct” decisions must be made from rational principles (i.e., in order for our action to have moral worth we must act from rational principles 10). In telling us that ethical concepts require absolute necessitation and are grounded in rationality, the ethical rationalist is thereby adhering to a certain framework, and any theory 9 Ibid. “[A]n action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon…” (4:439). Cf. 4:401. 10 Joey Miller 7 within this framework suggests or invites certain questions that the theory must answer. It is to this framework and these questions that we now turn11. III. The “Why Be Moral” Question After having established how the ethical rationalist theory is structured, we are now able to ask “ok… why should I care?”. This question can be answered by seeing whether the theory does what it is suppose to do; i.e., after explaining the theory, we can see the framework12 within which specific types of theories operate, and we should be able to use the theories for their purported purpose. The ethical rationalists theory is operating within a framework which purports to tell us that ethical theories should address what ‘morality’ is (i.e., how it is defined, understood, discussed, etc.), and how to decide whether something is right and wrong or good and bad 13 (this can be seen by recognizing that the ethical rationalist theory, as put forth by Kant, is structurally based on ‘morality’ requiring (i) absolute necessitation, thus, universal application, and (ii) moral decisions coming from rational principles). If a theory within this framework fails to do at least these two 11 Again, anyone taking this rationalist approach, thus operating in this framework, I am referring to as an ethical rationalist. 12 I am taking the term ‘framework’ to refer to the set of assumptions that must be made before constructing a theory, as well as what questions must be addressed by a theory of the specified type. 13 One question of particular interest is “what is an ethical theory suppose to do?” (i.e., what are theories of the type pertaining to ethics suppose to tell us?). However, as this is not the issue of the discussion at hand I will not be addressing it here. What is of importance here is recognizing that the ethical rationalist claims to be giving us a theory within a framework which is suppose to tell us what morality is and how to make moral decisions; e.g., the ethical rationalist’s theory tells us that morality reduces to being rational and to make moral decisions we have to act from rational principles. Regardless of whether this is what an ethical theory should do (i.e., whether this is the right framework), which is a question concerning theory construction, the framework still provides us with an explanation of what theories of the relevant kind (e.g., theories within the framework) are suppose to do (i.e., tell us what morality is and how to make moral decisions). That is, it does not really matter if it does what an ethical theory should do, so long as a theory operating from within the specified framework does what the framework claims it is suppose to do. Joey Miller 8 things, then it is not a good theory (i.e., it is of no use)14. For example, think of a theory that operates within a framework that purports to tell us that we need to know how to travel through outer space (e.g., a theory that tells us how to travel to the moon). Since we have to go through outer space to get to the moon, a theory that tells us how to get to the moon would not be a good theory if it did not tell us how to travel through outer space (i.e., if it did not provide us with a way of getting into and through outer space, thus, failing to get us to the moon). If our framework is then suppose to tell us what morality is and how to make moral decisions, then theories within that framework had better do an adequate job of addressing both questions; otherwise, we have no reason to accept them. Fortunately, for the ethical rationalists, they seem to meet this adequacy condition by providing an answer to both questions. Concerning how we should understand morality, the ethical rationalist will claim that ‘morality’ basically reduces to ‘rationality’; in other words, what it means to be ‘moral’ is simply to be ‘rational’. This then gives us an answer to the second question: ‘how do I make moral decisions?’. Given that ‘morality’ reduces or refers to ‘rationality’, when the ethical rationalist is approached with the question of how we make moral decisions they can respond by claiming that we make moral decisions by acting from rational principles. Thus, the ethical rationalist seems to have adequate answers to both questions (i.e., the theory does what it is suppose to do). 14 I am not, by any means, purporting to give an exhaustive list of the presuppositions or questions that need addressing in the aforementioned framework. I am only discussing the two that I have stated because of their relevance to the present discussion. Joey Miller 9 However, now that we have established what it means to be moral, we can ask the further question of ‘why be moral?’15. To this question the ethical rationalist seems to have a pretty straightforward answer. What it means to be ‘moral’ is simply to be ‘rational’, so the why be moral question reduces to ‘why be rational?’. Since the why be moral question follows from the two previously discussed questions, thereby making this question a part of the framework within which the ethical rationalist is working, the ethical rationalist needs to address this question as well. In what follows I will explain the two options the ethical rationalist has in addressing the question, ‘why be rational?’. IV. The Two Options A. Ridiculous Question The first option the ethical rationalist can take in addressing the question, ‘why be rational?’ is to claim that the question itself is ridiculous. If the claim is that the question is ridiculous, a natural follow-up question seems to be, ‘why is it ridiculous?’. To this question the ethical rationalist can claim that the question is ridiculous by appealing to brute fact. That is, they can claim that the question is ridiculous because it just is a brute fact that we are rational beings. For example, given that someone is five feet and four inches tall (5’ 4”), it would be ridiculous to ask, ‘why be 5’ 4”?”. 15 I am positing this question as being a part of the aforementioned framework (i.e., this is a question that theories operating within this framework need to address as well). It is being mentioned now because it was not clear why it needed to be asked until the first two questions were addressed. Joey Miller 10 However, if this is the approach taken in answering the why be rational question, then we are appealing to empirical facts; we are appealing to the fact that we simply are rational, and appealing to empirical facts undermines the grounding of ethical concepts in rational principles. In order for us to know that we are rational we have to appeal to some observable (i.e., empirical) fact about our nature or constitution. That is, while it can be argued that ethical concepts must be derived a priori, it is another thing to claim that we are rational beings a priori (or, that we are, a priori, rational beings)16. It is not a priori known that we actually are rational beings; this is based on the empirical fact that we exist and that we exist as rational beings (e.g., you have to check the observable-world to see whether humans actually exist and whether they are actually rational). To this objection the ethical rationalist can respond by saying that the question (‘why be rational?’) is ridiculous, not by appealing to brute fact, but by claiming that the statement that ‘we just are rational’ is not what they would say in response. Rather, in response, what is being claimed is that ‘morality’ does not reduce strictly to ‘rationality’; instead, for morality to exist, ethical concepts need to be grounded on rational principles before appeals to empirical claims can be made. In other words, what is being claimed is that if ethical concepts exist, then they must be derived a priori (which presupposes that a priori derivations must be done by rational 16 The claim is worded in two different ways to distinguish between the idea that humans could not exist without being rational (“we are, a priori, rational beings”) and the idea that we can know humans are rational through introspection (“we are rational beings a priori”). That is, in the first sense, it is logically necessary that humans are rational, and, in the second sense, it is not with reference to any observable fact that we can claim humans are rational. Joey Miller 11 agents), and this is not to claim that there actually exists any rational beings, thereby, ethical concepts. However, for morality to exist the ethical concepts need to be grounded in rational principles. So, the question, ‘why be rational?’ is ridiculous because morality is not reducible strictly to rationality (i.e., the question, ‘why be moral?’ cannot be reduced to the question, ‘why be rational?’); rationality is just the foundation, but that is not to necessarily exclude all empirical appeals. In light of this newly structured, and better understood, response by the ethical rationalist, we can now see that appeals to empirical claims are not incompatible or contradictory with the claims of ethical rationalists. All that follows from the ethical rationalists’ argument is that the ethical concepts must be derived a priori before appeals to empirical matters take place. For example, the concept of ‘the moral law’ needs to be derived a priori, but how the concept applies can reference empirical claims (i.e., the ethical concepts need to be derived a priori, but the contents of those concepts can be empirical). So, the categorical imperative is grounded a priori in rationality, but how it applies in certain situations can take empirical considerations into account. In other words, the claim is that when we are deriving ethical concepts we can appeal to empirical facts only after we appeal to rational principles (appealing to rational principles takes priority over appeals to empirical facts). This response now accurately demonstrates why the question, ‘why be rational?’ is ridiculous. It is ridiculous because it arose in response to Joey Miller 12 reducing morality to rationality, which was inappropriate because the ethical rationalist was never making such a claim. Morality cannot be reduced to rationality; rather, if morality is to exist, then ethical concepts must be derived a priori. However, even if the question, ‘why be rational?’ is now shown to be ridiculous, we can alter the question slightly and ask, ‘why ought I be rational?’17. We are now asking, ‘why should I care about the reasons provided for grounding ethical concepts a priori in rational principles rather than empirical appeals?’. Given the newly formulated question, it no longer seems like the ethical rationalist can claim that the question is simply ridiculous and brush it off. Instead, when posed with this question the ethical rationalist seems required to provide an answer. This leads to the only other option the ethical rationalist has in addressing the why be rational question (which is now ‘why ought I be rational?’): they can see the question as a legitimate concern and attempt to provide an answer. B. Legitimate Concern The question, ‘why ought I be rational?’ (instead of appealing to empirical considerations with regards to determining ethical concepts), is not to be understood as asking, ‘what reasons are there for grounding morality in rational principles prior to empirical considerations?’. Since the ethical 17 Although I have worded the question as ‘why ought I be rational?’ it should be understood as asking ‘why should I accept the reasons provided for grounding ethical concepts a priori in rational principles rather than empirical appeals?’. The wording of the question as ‘why ought I be rational?’ is simply a heuristic device used to illustrate the distinction between the current form of the question and the prior form, ‘why be rational?’, as well as to help remind the reader why the question has changed. Joey Miller 13 rationalists already provided an answer to this question (See section II), the question should be understood as, ‘what reasons do I for accepting or caring about the reasons provided?‘, or ‘why are those reasons motivating?’. One response the ethical rationalist could make is to claim that they were not attempting to provide an answer to why the reasons provided should be accepted. Or, in other words, the ethical rationalist was giving us reasons why ethical concepts need to be grounded a priori in rationality, which is not to give us reasons why those reasons should be accepted, and in doing so they do not need to provide us with an answer to this question concerning why we should accept the reasons they have provided. They do not need to provide reasons for accepting the reasons they initially provided because all they are concerned with is grounding ethical concepts a priori in rationality; not grounding all concepts. This, with the addition that any reason to accept the initial reasons given is some other kind of concept (i.e., not an ‘ethical’ concept), means that this question does not need to be necessarily grounded in rational principles a priori. However, this answer would be unsatisfactory given that the question, ‘what reasons do I for accepting or caring about the reasons provided [concerning why we should ground ethical concepts in rational principles before we take empirical considerations into account]?’, is an ethical question. The question is, ‘why should I accept or care about the reasons provided?’. Given the normative language of the question, this answer would also need to be grounded in rational principles a priori. This, however, seems Joey Miller 14 extremely difficult. In answering this question, it is not even clear how the ethical rationalist could respond. It seems like any such answer would have to appeal to some sort of self-interest or some other sort of appeal to empirical matter that would inevitably undermine the foundation of ethical concepts being in rational principles18. In other words, it is not clear what kind of answer would still be grounded in, or appeal to, rational principles a priori. The ethical rationalist seems to be forced to appeal to empirical considerations such as self-interest, promotion of happiness, agreeability, etc.; all of which must be done empirically, thus, not a priori. V. Concluding Remark Although I do not have sufficient time or space to make such an argument, I am going to suggest that any answer to the question, ‘why be moral?’, may have to be done within an Aristotelian Virtue Ethics framework19. Any answer must make some sort of empirical appeal to self- 18 This can be demonstrated by just looking at the different ways this question can be asked. Each way of asking the question seems to make reference to the individual asking or some other sort of notion involving self-interest (e.g., notice the use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ in asking the questions (i.e., ‘what reasons do I have…’), and implied in the term ‘motivating’ is the idea that it has to be motivating for the individual asking (i.e., ‘why is it motivating for me’)). I am inclined to say that there is not a way to answer this question without appealing to self-interest in some sense; however, such an argument cannot take place here, as it is outside the scope of this paper. The important point is that anyway of framing or articulating this question seems to require an appeal to some sort of self-interest, and, if this is what is required in answering the question, this seems to completely undermine grounding ethical concepts in rational principles. 19 See: Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. 2nd Ed. Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999. Joey Miller 15 interest (as opposed to other empirical considerations such as overall happiness, agreeability, fair distribution, etc.). Briefly: if we are able to get universal application by applying moral concepts to an entire species (e.g., it universally applies to humans) rather than “rational agents as such”20, then we seem to be able to preserve some sense of necessitation 21. Here I am thinking of Aristotle’s use of a telos being common to all members of a particular kind (e.g., species or communities). If we can establish a convincing argument for a particular shared telos, then we may be able to get ethical concepts (e.g., right, wrong, good, bad, etc.) without having to postulate the existence of further concepts such as ‘duty’, ‘obligation’, ‘the moral law’, etc22. Thus, ethical concepts could apply universally to all members within the specified set (i.e., of the relevant kind). The ethical concepts will be ‘necessitating’ (in a sense) as they are grounded in selfinterest, and what is in a particular thing’s self-interest is shared among members of the specified set (because the telos, being shared, is in each members ‘self-interest’). Whether such a telos exists still needs to be articulated. However, as I have stated, I cannot make such an argument here. All I hope to have done is to draw out why the question, ‘why be moral?’ is important, how we can and should put it to the ethical rationalist (i.e., how we can articulate it when confronting the ethical rationalist), and 20 21 4:408 It is another question to ask if this sense of necessitation is the same sense that the ethical rationalist were seeking, or if it is good enough to determine that morality exists (even the question regarding the existence of morality depends on our understanding of ‘morality’ and how we frame the questions of morality). 22 See: G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe. Eds. Mary Geach & Luke Gormally. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2005. 169-194. Joey Miller 16 why the ethical rationalist project seems doomed by not being able to provide an answer while maintaining the principle features of the approach. References Anscombe, G.E.M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe. Eds. Mary Geach & Luke Gormally. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2005. 169-194. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. 2nd Ed. Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Joey Miller Publishing Company, Inc., 1999. 17 Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Trans. & Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 37108. Word Count: 3,483